Efficient Probabilistic Fines Under Negative Externalities by Franke, Jorg & Nandeibam, Shasi
        
Citation for published version:
Franke, J & Nandeibam, S 2021 'Efficient Probabilistic Fines Under Negative Externalities' Bath Economics






If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





Efficient Probabilistic Fines Under Negative Externalities 
 
 






















Efficient Probabilistic Fines Under Negative
Externalities










We introduce a probabilistic fine scheme into a simple model of a public bad
with negative externalities. As the fine scheme is probabilistic, an agent’s
probability to be fined depends on its relative action level. This induces a
counteracting positive externality into the model because the individual fine
probability depends not only on own actions but also on the actions of other
agents. In our analysis we derive conditions on the primitives of the model
that guarantee the existence of an efficient equilibrium where the negative
externality of the public bad is neutralised by the positive externality from
the fine scheme. We also demonstrate that a fine scheme can always be
designed in such a way that an efficient outcome is induced as a pure strategy
equilibrium.
Key Words: Negative externalities, probabilistic fines, efficiency, equilibrium
existence, lottery contest.
JEL classification: C72; D62; H23
1 Introduction
Several of the most pressing environmental and social problems are related to the
existence of negative externalities (e.g., global warming caused by greenhouse
gas emissions), where an agent obtains private profits through its actions but si-
multaneously induces negative externalities on all other agents. As agents typ-
ically do not take into account the fact that their actions are a ’public bad’ for
others, the resulting unregulated equilibrium outcome will be inefficient due to
either over-production or over-consumption of the agents. If individual actions
are observable, then a central authority is able to restore an efficient equilibrium
outcome by resorting to simple policies and interventions like mandates or cor-
rective Pigou-taxation that internalise these externalities. If individual actions
are non-observable, however, efficiency-restoring policies (like Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism and its variants) exist but are less intuitive and therefore harder
to implement in practise.
In this paper we combine a public bad-framework with a simple and intuitive
probabilistic fine scheme, where the probability that a specific agent is fined de-
pends on its relative action in the sense that it is increasing in own action but
decreasing in the aggregate action of all agents. This specific fine scheme can
be interpreted as resulting from an imperfect monitoring system where agents are
inspected randomly to evaluate their actions. If individual detection is more likely
the ’higher’ (in the sense of intensity and/or frequency) the respective individual
action level but less likely the higher the aggregate action level, then the perceived
probability to be detected (and therefore fined) has the mentioned properties. We
discuss two applications to clarify this interpretation of a probabilistic fine scheme
depending on the relative action level of the respective agent.
The first application considers policing in the context of the recent COVID-19
pandemic where several governments issued national restrictions on social inter-
actions to control the spread of the virus. Naturally, violating these restrictions
increases the utility of the violator but induces a negative externality on the com-
munity. In order to preserve rule-abiding behaviour, violations of these restrictions
are monitored and sanctioned, if detected, by the police (in the UK, for instance,
breaches of self-isolation rules can be fined up to GBP 10, 000 ’for the most egre-
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gious breaches’). In this context it makes sense to assume that the probability that
a rule-breaking individual is detected and fined is, firstly, higher the more often
this individual violates the rule, and secondly, lower the higher the total rate of
rule-infringements in the community.1 Hence, from the perspective of an indi-
vidual the fine probability depends on her relative rate of rule-violation which is
captured by the probabilistic fine schemes that we apply in our setup.
The second application is based on the so called non-point pollution control
problem, compare Segerson (1988), as well as Shortle and Horan (2001) and
Xepapadeas (2011) for surveys. Although perfect monitoring on the level of the
individual polluter is assumed to be prohibitively costly in these types of non-
point pollution problems, regulatory authorities are still able to resort to imperfect
monitoring techniques like unexpected inspections of individual polluters. Also
in this context it makes sense to assume that the fine probability is increasing in
the individual emission level and decreasing in total emission by all firms. Hence,
the ex-ante probability of a specific polluter to be detected and fined depends on
the relative emission of this agent in the same ways as in our specification of a
probabilistic fine scheme.
We now discuss our setup and approach in more detail and relegate the discus-
sion of potential extensions and generalisations to the last section of this paper. In
the following, we adopt an environmental economics terminology inspired by the
non-point pollution control problem mentioned before to guide intuition; however,
our approach is applicable to any public bad situation with negative externalities
where probabilistic fine schemes might be of relevance. We consider a simple
model of negative externalities induced through strategic emissions based on a
quasi-linear framework with identical agents. Each agent derives positive profit
from individual production which is linked one-to-one to individual emissions
inducing a damage on the entire community. As each agent decides about its
individual production/emission level strategically taking into account individual
profit and individual damage instead of total damage, the unregulated equilibrium
results in inefficient emission levels that are higher than the optimal amount.
1The last mentioned characteristic can be attributed to congestion in law enforcement, see
Ferrer (2010), Freeman et al. (1996) and Ehrlich (1973), for contributions that make a similar
assumption and discuss its implications.
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We then introduce a probabilistic fine scheme into this setting where an agent’s
probability to be fined depends on a relative measure of its emission level. The
fine scheme is modelled based on a modified lottery contest success function in
the style of Tullock (1980), where we allow for affine transformations of individ-
ual emission levels as in Dasgupta and Nti (1998). Based on this specification, the
fine probability is increasing and concave in own emission levels and decreasing
in aggregated emission levels. This generates a positive externality (a higher in-
dividual fine probability also implies a lower fine probability for all other agents),
which has the potential to counterbalance the negative externality stemming from
the public bad characteristic of individual emissions. This mechanism has been
applied in a ’dual’ way in the literature that considers the financing of public
goods by the means of lotteries or raffles, compare Morgan (2000) for the semi-
nal contribution, where the positive externality of the public good is balanced to
some extent by the negative externality of the lottery. However, there is no direct
equivalence in the sense that one approach is the ’negative’ reverse version of the
other: Although we apply a similar (slightly more general) probability function
as in Morgan (2000), the resulting payoff-function in our case is not globally con-
cave (because the expected fine payment in convex in individual emission). This
complicates the analysis because we cannot rely on standard techniques to char-
acterise equilibria as the existence of pure-strategy equilibria is not guaranteed for
this setup. In our analysis we therefore identify necessary and sufficient condi-
tions on the primitives of the model that guarantee the existence of a symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium for a given level of total emissions. Using these condi-
tions it is then straight-forward to verify whether the efficient emission levels can
be induced as a pure-strategy equilibrium and to derive the corresponding efficient
fine level.
We demonstrate that our characterization is tight by considering two special
cases: If the fine probability is modelled as a simple Tullock lottery contest suc-
cess function, then we can show that it is not possible to achieve the efficient emis-
sion levels as a pure-strategy equilibrium using this scheme. Nevertheless, the
conditions are instrumental for a second-best approach because they facilitate the
characterisation of the least inefficient total emission level that is still achievable
as a pure-strategy equilibrium in this case. If the fine probability incorporates also
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affine transformations of individual emission levels, then an appropriately speci-
fied fine scheme can induce efficient emission levels in equilibrium. Comparing
both cases suggests that an agent’s fine probability has to be bounded away from
zero even for small emission levels in order to allow for efficient emission in equi-
librium. This insight is verified in an extended setup, where the central authority
is assumed to have more discretionary power over the details of the fine scheme
(beyond setting only the appropriate fine level). For this extended setup we can
demonstrate that the efficient total emission level can be obtained as the unique
pure strategy equilibrium for any well-behaved damage function using appropriate
values for the parametrised fine scheme.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce our
formal model, before we deal with equilibrium existence and characterisation for
a given probabilistic fine scheme in section 3. In section 4 we analyse the question
whether equilibrium existence is guaranteed if the fine scheme parameters can be
designed appropriately. In section 5 we conclude by discussing the robustness of
our results with respect to potential extensions and generalisations.
2 The Model
There is a group N = {1, . . . , n} of identical agents that have access to a production
process where individual output is denoted by xi ≥ 0 for each agent i ∈ N. Output
can be sold on a competitive market at a fixed (normalized) prize of 1. The pro-
duction of output is linked one-to-one to the emission of pollutants such that indi-
vidual output and emission levels are strategically equivalent. Individual produc-
tion induces (through individual emissions) negative externalities on all agents,
which is captured by an individual damage function D(X) with X =
∑
j∈N x j de-
noting total emission, that satisfies standard assumptions: D′(X) > 0, D′′(X) > 0
and D′′′(X) ≥ 0. Individual payoff can therefore be expressed as a well-behaved
quasi-linear function of individual emissions:
u(xi, x−i) = xi − D(X) for all i ∈ N.
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As the payoff function is concave, the total equilibrium emission level X∗ is char-
acterized by first-order conditions:
D′(X∗) = 1. (1)
Due to the quasi-linear form of the payoff function, the efficient total emission
level X̂ is obtained by maximizing the sum of individual payoff functions which
yields the following Samuelson-condition:
D′(X̂) = 1/n. (2)
Comparing the two equations it is obvious that there is inefficient over-emission
in equilibrium: X∗ > X̂.
We now consider a sanction mechanism that induces a probabilistic but fixed
fine F > 0 on polluting agents. For each x = (x1, . . . , xn) we denote the set of









The individual probability to be fined is proportional to an affine transformation













for xi > 0 where a ≥ 0, b > 0,
0 otherwise.
Note, that Pri(xi, x−i) is a well-behaved probability function, which is increas-
ing and concave in xi and decreasing in x j for j , i.
2 This specification also
contains (for a = 0 and b = 1) the simple proportional rule as special case, which
coincides with the well-known lottery contest success function.
We assume that the proceeds of the sanction scheme are redistributed to pol-
luting agents on a lump-sum basis, which yields the following expected payoff
function:















if xi > 0,
−D(X) otherwise.
(3)
2For a > 0 the probability function has a discontinuity at xi = 0. This property is one of the
two technical assumptions needed to rule out asymmetric equilibria at the boundary.
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A brief discussion of the properties of this modified payoff function should be in
order at this point. Note first, that non-polluting agents are neither fined nor benefit
from redistribution of the collected fine.3 Note secondly, that due to the concavity
of the probability function Pri(xi, x−i), the resulting function u(xi, x−i; F) might be
neither concave, nor quasi-concave in the interior of the strategy space. In fact,
depending on the curvature of the damage function and the parameters (a, b, n, F),
the payoff function can have several local maxima in the interior of the strategy
space that might be payoff-dominated by strategies at the boundary. Hence, the
existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies is not guaranteed without further
restrictions on the primitives of the setup.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Before addressing the question of efficiency, we first have to identify conditions
that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.4 The following
result provides these conditions for a given target level X̃ of total emissions. The
idea behind this result is to bound the curvature of the damage function in such a
way that the target level X̃ coincides with a local maximum of the payoff function
while guaranteeing at the same time that unilateral deviations are not profitable.
Based on this result it is then straight-forward to address the question whether the
efficient level X̂ can be induced as a pure-strategy equilibrium and to derive the
corresponding fine level in the subsequent corollary.
Proposition 3.1 Let X̃ > 0 with x̃ = X̃
n
be a given total emission level. There exists
a finite fine level F̃ > 0 such that (x̃, . . . , x̃) is the unique pure strategy equilibrium









D(nx̃) − D((n − 1)x̃)
nx̃ − (n − 1)x̃
≤ 1 −
n(a + bx̃)(1 − D′(nx̃))
na + (n − 1)bx̃
.
3This is the second technical assumption that is necessary to rule out asymmetric equilibria at
the boundary. Without these two assumption most of our results except uniqueness would still be
valid.
4The issue of mixed-strategy equilibria is discussed in the last section.
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Proof. The proof consists of three parts. In the first part we show that if F̃
is a fine that induces (x̃, . . . , x̃) as the unique pure strategy equilibrium, then the
two conditions (i) and (ii) have to be satisfied. The second part proves that any
unilateral deviation from (x̃, . . . , x̃) satisfying these two conditions will induce a
lower payoff. Hence, (x̃, . . . , x̃) is a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium. The
third part demonstrates that the equilibrium is unique.
Part 1: Suppose F̃ is a fine such that (x̃, . . . , x̃) is the unique pure strategy
equilibrium. Then it has to satisfy first-order conditions that can also be used to
derive a closed form expression for F̃ using symmetry:





n2(a + bx̃)(1 − D′(nx̃))
(n − 1)b
.
Second-order conditions have to be satisfied locally for (x̃, . . . , x̃) to be an equi-












Moreover, as (x̃, . . . , x̃) is an equilibrium, a unilateral deviation of agent i suffi-
ciently close to the lower boundary of the strategy space cannot induce a higher
payoff.5 Hence, the following inequality has to hold, which can be simplified
further using symmetry and substituting F̃, which yields condition (ii):
lim
xi→0
u(xi, x̃−i; F̃) ≤ u(x̃, x̃−i; F̃)
⇒ 0 − D((n − 1)x̃) −
(
a





≤ x̃ − D(nx̃)






na + b(n − 1)x̃
)
F̃
5In the second part of the proof we also show that any other unilateral deviation to the interior
of the strategy space induces lower payoff.
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⇒ D(nx̃) − D((n − 1)x̃) ≤
(
1 −
n(a + bx̃)(1 − D′(nx̃))
na + (n − 1)bx̃
)
x̃. (6)
Note, that neither a unilateral deviation to zero can be profitable because it can
be verified that:
u(0, x̃−i; F̃) = 0 − D((n − 1)x̃)
< 0 − D((n − 1)x̃) −
(
a







u(xi, x̃−i; F̃) ≤ u(x̃, x̃−i; F̃)
Part 2: Let F̃ =
n2(a+bx̃)(1−D′(nx̃))
(n−1)b
and assume that conditions (i) and (ii) are
satisfied. Then it can be checked that (x̃, . . . , x̃) corresponds to a local maximum
of the payoff function because eq. (4) and (5) are satisfied. Moreover, eq. (6)
is satisfied as well implying that unilateral deviations to the lower boundary of
the strategy space are not profitable. It remains to be shown that other unilateral
deviations to the interior of the strategy space are not profitable as well. If there
is a profitable deviation in the interval (0, x̃), then there must also exist another
local maximum in (0, x̃) because we already ruled out profitable deviations at
the boundary. We will therefore first demonstrate (by contradiction) that a local
maximum at x̄ ∈ (0, x̃) does not exist. We will then demonstrate that deviations
x̄ > x̃ can neither be profitable.
Suppose there exists a local maximum for agent i at x̄ ∈ (0, x̃) given that all
other agents j , i choose x̃. Then it must be the case that
−D′′((n − 1)x̃ + x̄) +
2b2(n − 1)(a + bx̃)
(na + b((n − 1)x̃ + x̄))3
F̃ ≤ 0,
which implies together with D′′′ ≥ 0 that for all x > x̄ the following inequality
holds:
−D′′((n − 1)x̃ + x) +
2b2(n − 1)(a + bx̃)
(na + b((n − 1)x̃ + x))3
F̃ < 0.
Note that both x̃ and x̄ correspond to local maxima; hence, there must exist at
least one x′ ∈ (x̄, x̃) where the payoff function is (at least weakly) convex in a
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neighbourhood of this point:
−D′′((n − 1)x̃ + x′) +
2b2(n − 1)(a + bx̃)
(na + b((n − 1)x̃ + x′))3
F̃ ≥ 0.
As x′ > x̄ this is a contradiction to the previously established strict inequality
We now prove that there cannot exist a profitable deviations x > x̃. As x̃
corresponds to a local maximum, it must be the case that the payoff function is
strictly concave on (x̃,∞) because a similar argument to the one above gives us
−D′′((n − 1)x̃ + x) +
2b2(n − 1)(a + bx̃)
(na + b((n − 1)x̃ + x))3
F̃ < 0 for all x > x̃.
Hence, payoff must be lower for all x > x̃ which implies that a deviation from x̃
to x > x̃ cannot be profitable.
Part 3: Let F̃ be as defined at the beginning of Part 2 such that (x̃, . . . , x̃) is a
pure strategy equilibrium.
Step 1: Suppose x = (x1, . . . , xn) , (x̃, . . . , x̃) is also a pure strategy equilibrium.
Let X =
∑
j∈N x j. Clearly, X > 0. We first show by contradiction that x j > 0 for
all j ∈ N. Suppose to the contrary that there exists j such that x j = 0. Then it can
be verified that
u(0, x− j; F̃) = 0 − D(X)
























u(x j, x− j; F̃),
which implies that it is profitable for agent j to unilaterally deviate from x = 0,
a contradiction. Hence, xi > 0 for all i ∈ N. Thus, it follows from the first-order
conditions that x1 = . . . = xn, i.e., x is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Therefore, every pure strategy equilibrium corresponding to the fine F̃ is symmet-
ric.
Step 2: Given Step 1, we only need to show that there does not exist a symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium that is distinct from (x̃, . . . , x̃).
9
Suppose 0 < Z̃ , X̃ with z̃ = Z̃
n
is such that (z̃, . . . , z̃) is also a pure strategy
equilibrium for the fine level F̃. Then we have the following FOCs and SOCs for
a local maximum:
















Define G(X) = 1 − D′(X) −
b(n−1)F̃
n(na+bX)
for all X > 0. Then we have:
G′(X) = −D′′(X) +
b2(n − 1)F̃
n(na + bX)2
for all X > 0 (11)
G′′(X) = −D′′′(X) −
2b3(n − 1)F̃
n(na + bX)3
< 0 for all X > 0. (12)
Now, (7) and (8) imply:
G(X̃) = 1 − D′(X̃) −
b(n − 1)F̃
n(na + bX̃)




G(Z̃) = 1 − D′(Z̃) −
b(n − 1)F̃
n(na + bZ̃)




Also, (9), (10) and (11) imply:
G′(X̃) = −D′′(X̃) +
b2(n − 1)F̃
n(na + bX̃)2
= − D′′(X̃) +
b2(n − 1)F̃
n3(a + bx̃)2




G′(Z̃) = −D′′(Z̃) +
b2(n − 1)F̃
n(na + bZ̃)2
= − D′′(Z̃) +
b2(n − 1)F̃
n3(a + bz̃)2





However, G′(X̃) < 0, G′(Z̃) < 0 and G′′(X) < 0 for all X > 0 imply that it is
not possible to have both G(X̃) = 0 and G(Z̃) = 0, a contradiction. Therefore,
there does not exist a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that is distinct from
(x̃, . . . , x̃). 
Proposition 3.1 does not address the issue of efficiency. However, using the
Samuelson condition from eq. (2) to simplify conditions (i) and (ii) leads to the
following corollary which provides the respective conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium that yields the efficient emission level.
Corollary 3.2 Given fine F̂ =
n(a+bx̂)
b
with x̂ = X̂
n
, the efficient total emission level
X̂ can be achieved as the unique pure strategy equilibrium (x̂, . . . , x̂) if and only if






D(nx̂) − D((n − 1)x̂)
nx̂ − (n − 1)x̂
≤
a




Condition (iv) can be used to derive the following negative result with re-
spect to a specific class of probabilistic fine schemes that include linear (instead
of affine) transformations of emissions.
Corollary 3.3 A probabilistic fine scheme with a = 0 (which includes the simple
lottery contest success function as special case) cannot induce the efficient total
emission level X̂ as equilibrium outcome.
Proof. For a = 0 condition (iv) reduces to
D(nx̂)−D((n−1)x̂)
nx̂−(n−1)x̂
≤ 0. This is a contradic-
tion because the left-hand side of this inequality is positive as D(·) is increasing. 
In order to gain further intuition with respect to these conditions, we now con-
sider two special cases. The first case is related to Corollary 3.3 and considers
the standard lottery contest success function (or, alternatively, a simple propor-
tional fine probability). While Corollary 3.3 implies that the efficient emission
level cannot be obtained as a pure strategy equilibrium, the two conditions (i) and
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Figure 1: Case 1 with u(x1, x̂2; F̂)
(ii) can be used to identify a fine that leads to the most efficient emission level that
is achievable as a pure strategy equilibrium. The second case demonstrates that a
simple modification of the lottery contest success function is sufficient to restore
efficiency in equilibrium. Hence, we are able to demonstrate that there exist well-
behaved damage functions and fine schemes such that conditions (i) and (ii), and
also (iii) and (iv) respectively, are both satisfied.
Case 1. Consider the following specification that corresponds to a proportional
fine probability function: (a, b, n) = (0, 1, 2) with D(X) = 1
2
X2. For this specifi-
cation the efficient emission level is X̂ = 1
2
which is lower than the equilibrium
emission level without fine: X∗ = 1. Condition (iii) of Corollary 3.2 is violated
(2 ≤ 1) as well as condition (iv) (3/8 ≤ 0). Figure 1 shows the payoff function
of agent 1, given that agent 2 extracts the efficient amount x̂2 = 1/4. Note, that
x̂1 = 1/4 corresponds to a critical point, which is neither a local maximum nor a
global maximum (instead, x̂1 = 1/4 corresponds to a local minimum).
Nevertheless, Proposition 1 can be used to derive the lowest total emission
level that is achievable as a pure strategy equilibrium. Setting X̃ = 4/5 implies
that condition (i) is satisfied with strict inequality (5/2 < 5), while condition
(ii) is satisfied by equality. Hence, X̃ = 4/5 is the lowest total emission level
that is achievable in this case. The corresponding fine level is F̃ = 8/25 and
the respective payoff function for agent 1 is presented in Figure 2. Note that the
second-best emission level x̃1 = 0.4 now corresponds to a global maximum.
Case 2. Consider the following slight modification of the previous specifica-
tion: (a, b, n) = (1, 1, 2) with D(X) = 1
2
X2. Now the fine probability is bounded
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Figure 2: Case 1 with u(x1, x̃2; F̃)




Figure 3: Case 2. u(x1, x̂2; F̂)
away from zero for any individual emission level: Pri(xi, x−i) =
1+xi
2+X
> 0 for all
xi > 0. Note that the efficient emission level from Case 1 remains unaltered be-
cause the damage function is the same. For this specification it can be verified
that conditions (iii) and (iv) from Corollary 3.2 are satisfied. Hence, based on
the corresponding fine F̂ = 5/2 the efficient emission level can be achieved as
a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Figure 3 shows the respective payoff
function for this case and demonstrates that the individual emission level x̂1 = 1/4
corresponds to a global maximum.
4 Designing An Efficient Fine Scheme
Until now all parameters except the fine level F have been assumed to be given.
Alternatively, the parameters (a, b) that determine the affine transformation in the
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fine scheme could be interpreted as additional choice variables in a design problem
of the central authority. In this case the design problem is to choose (a, b, F) ∈
R+ × R++ × R+ in order to implement a specific emission level Z ∈ (0, X
∗) as
a unique pure strategy equilibrium.6 The next result demonstrates that this is
possible for any emission level Z ∈ (0, X∗) using appropriate values for the choice
variables.
Proposition 4.1 Let Z be any total emission level in the interval (0, X∗) and let
z = Z
n
. Then there exists (aZ , bZ, FZ) ∈ R+ × R++ × R+ such that the symmetric
emission vector (z, . . . , z) is the unique pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Let Z ∈ (0, X∗) and z = Z
n
. Because we have derived a closed form
expression for the fine level in the proof of Proposition 1, it is sufficient to show
that there exists (aZ , bZ) ∈ R+×R++ such that conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition
1 are satisfied.




= 0, condition (i) is satisfied for sufficiently large a. Next, it






= D′(nz). Also, it follows from
strict convexity of D(·) that
D(nz)−D((n−1)z)
nz−(n−1)z
< D′(nz). Hence, condition (ii) is also
satisfied for sufficiently large a. Therefore, given any bZ ∈ R++, there exists suffi-
ciently large aZ such that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. 
The insights from the proof of this proposition confirm the intuition from the
two cases provided in the previous section of the paper: Setting parameter a suf-
ficiently high (bounding the fine probability away from zero even for small indi-
vidual emission levels) is crucial to induce an efficient equilibrium outcome.7
6The efficient emission level X̂ derived in eq. (2) is contained in this set (0, X∗), where X∗ is the
equilibrium emission level without any fine characterised in eq. (1). Hence, the following result
holds also for the efficient emission level.
7This result has a dual expression in the contest literature: In Dasgupta and Nti (1998) it is




Our approach demonstrates that probabilistic fine schemes can be designed in such
a way that efficient outcomes result in equilibrium under negative externalities.
Naturally, the simple setup applied here facilitates the analysis but also raises
issues of robustness with respect to potential generalisations and extensions. In the
following we discuss some potential extensions regarding other types of negative
externalities, heterogeneity of agents, and the issue of mixed-strategy equilibria,
which open up further research possibilities.
In our setup negative externalities are captured by an additive-separable dam-
age function which allows for sufficient tractability. However, our approach is
potentially also applicable in the context of alternative specifications. Consider,
for instance, the classical common pool resource extraction game as specified in
Ostrom et al. (1992), where the following functional form (adapted to our nota-
tion and ignoring wealth constraints) is applied: ui(x) =
xi
X
f (X)− xi, where f (X) is
a concave function. In this specification individual profit (i.e. the first term) is in-
creasing in own resource extraction but negatively affected by aggregate extraction
levels. In contrast to our specification individual profit and aggregate damage are
not additively separable. However, the resulting tragedy of the commons implies
that there is still inefficient over-extraction in the symmetric Nash-equilibrium.8
As the setup is well-behaved with a concave payoff-function, it can be modified
accordingly by adding the same probabilistic fine scheme as in our setup. We
conjecture that the exact conditions to guarantee the existence of an efficient sym-
metric pure strategy equilibrium will be more complex but could be derived using
the same approach: Firstly, guaranteeing local concavity in equilibrium and, sec-
ondly, excluding unilateral deviations to the boundary by restricting the curvature
of the profit function.
Our analysis relies on equilibrium symmetry which will not hold if agents are
heterogeneous. Hence, it is unlikely that a symmetric probabilistic fine scheme
can restore efficiency in a setup with heterogeneous agents9 because this would
8Ostrom (1990) analyses real instances of successfully governed commons and demonstrates
that these mechanisms typically entail monitoring of extraction levels and sanctioning of over-
extracting agents through fines.
9Applying a symmetric probabilistic fine scheme in a model with heterogeneous agent might
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require either idiosyncratic fines specifically designed for each agent (using a
Lindahl-pricing approach) or biased probability functions (as used in Franke and
Leininger (2014) in a public good context). Designing those idiosyncratic fines or
biases would require complete information with respect to individual preference
parameters of the agents. This leads to the typical problem of truthful preference
revaluation which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
In our analysis we focused on the identification of conditions that guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies and did not address the issue of
mixed-strategy equilibria. Although Glicksberg (1952) is not directly applicable
due to the discontinuity of the payoff function at xi = 0 (comp., footnote 2), there
might still exist equilibria in mixed strategies if the conditions for a pure-strategy
equilibrium are not met. Unfortunately, the characterisation of such an equilib-
rium is not trivial (comp. Ewerhart (2015) for some recent work on mixed-strategy
equilibrium analysis in the case of standard Tullock contest games). Analysing
whether probabilistic fine schemes might restore efficiency in specifications where
mixed-strategy equilibria exist might therefore constitute an interesting research
possibility that we plan to address in the future.
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